FindLaw's Supreme Court Of Arkansas Case And Opinions. A Law Firm Received 2000

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

MOBLEY LAW FIRM, P.A. v. LISLE LAW FIRM, P.A.

No. 03-159.

Decided: June 26, 2003

Mobley Law Firm, P.A., by:  Jeff Mobley, Russellville, appropriate to appellant. Lisle Law Firm, P.A., by:  Chris Lisle, Springdale, appropriate to appellee.

Attorney Jeff Mobley of Mobley Law Firm, P.A. appeals a trial court's order finding that Mr. Mobley was fired appropriate to origin via his client, Chris Barnett, also that he should be present awarded $4,166.67, one-fourth of the attorney's fees received out of the settlement, appropriate to the work he performed while Mr. Barnett's attorney.   Mr. Mobley argues that the attorney's lien statute should control also that his give of fees should be present increased to one-third of the settlement, an quantity equal to 100 percent of all attorney's fees collected out of the settlement proceeds.   In the alternative, he argues that according to the principle of quantum meruit, he is entitled to a larger portion of the attorney's fees than the trial bar awarded.   Appellee, Lisle Law Firm, the solid hired via Mr. Barnett to take the place of Mr. Mobley, responds that the trial court's order should stand.   We agree accompanied by appellee, also we affirm.

On May 19, 2000, Mr. Barnett contacted Mr. Mobley regarding his injuries also medical bills resulting from an automobile accident that occurred on January 11, 2000.   Mr. Barnett signed a contract accompanied by Mr. Mobley that declared Mr. Mobley his solicitor in this matter also that entitled Mr. Mobley to thirty-three also one-third percent of a scrap of settlement prior to litigation.   In the event case occurred, Mr. Mobley would then be present entitled to forty percent of a scrap of settlement, also in the event of an plead to this court, Mr. Mobley would be present entitled to receive fifty percent of whatever recovery resulted.   The contract further stipulated that Mr. Mobley would be present entitled to reimbursement of a scrap of out-of-pocket expenses incurred throughout the suit.

On May 25, 2000, Mr. Mobley sent representation education to the various hospitals complicated in Mr. Barnett's care informing them that he was Mr. Barnett's attorney.   Mr. Mobley too sent lien education to the insurance companies also the chauffeur of the other automobile.   Mr. Mobley too sent Mr. Barnett's medical bills requested via the third-party insurance carrier.

Mr. Mobley also Mr. Barnett began to have personal conflicts throughout this time.   After several instances of objection between the two, particularly regarding the rate at which the case was progressing, Mr. Mobley told Mr. Barnett that he did not “have a speedometer up his ass.”

On September 7, 2000, Mr. Mobley received a letter from Mr. Barnett terminating his services.   On that same date, Mr. Mobley received a letter from Lisle Law Firm informing Mr. Mobley of Deric Yoakley's management of Mr. Barnett's case.   Mr. Barnett's letter cited Mr. Mobley's failure to send education to health-care providers explaining his inability to pay his bill, also failure to discuss the case accompanied by him while his reasons appropriate to terminating Mr. Mobley's services.

Roughly fourteen months later, the case was settled appropriate to $50,000.00 accompanied by $25,000.00 from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier also $25,000.00 from the underinsured carrier.   On November 13, 2001, the Lisle Law Firm filed a motion appropriate to declaratory judgment in the Pope County Circuit Court tendering the entire quantity of the attorney's fees also requesting that the bar control the rights also status of Mr. Mobley also Mr. Yoakley.¹  Mr. Mobley filed a response also counterclaim denying that he was fired appropriate to origin also asserting that he should recover one-third of the $50,000.00 settlement based on the attorney's lien statute also not a quantum meruit basis.   After hearing testimony from witnesses appropriate to both appellee also appellant, the trial bar establish that Mr. Mobley was terminated appropriate to origin also was entitled to sensible quantum meruit recovery of one-fourth of the attorney's fees, or $4,166.67. It is from this order that Mr. Mobley appeals.

 We review chancery cases de novo on the record also will not disturb the findings of the chancellor unless clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Williams v. Ashley, 319 Ark. 197, 890 S.W.2d 260 (1995).   Because the preponderance of the evidence turns largely on the credibility of the witnesses, we defer to the better position of the chancellor.  Id.

Mr. Mobley's first point on plead is whether the trial bar erred in finding he was fired appropriate to cause.   On this point, we affirm.

 There is no brightline rule appropriate to this bar to hire when determining whether an solicitor was fired appropriate to cause.   However, we have reviewed the issue several times.   In Williams, supra, we firm that an solicitor was fired appropriate to origin when the solicitor scheduled also attended an unnecessary hearing.  Id. After the hearing, the consumer was never once more able to communicate accompanied by her lawyer.  Id. Furthermore, in the beginning of their relationship, the consumer was unable to speak accompanied by her solicitor also was referred to the secretary accompanied by her judiciary questions.  Id. We held that “it is implicit in the trial court's findings of fact that appellant was discharged via appellee appropriate to cause.”  Id.

In Crockett & Brown, P.A. v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993), we affirmed the trial court's finding that an solicitor was fired appropriate to origin when payment of the attorneys throughout the case became an acrimonious issue.   Id.

Here, the trial bar establish in its order that Mr. Mobley was fired appropriate to origin also cited the following facts:

Mr. Barnett was anxious to learn regarding the progress of his case.   He was receiving calls to collect on his medical bills.   During the meeting accompanied by his client, Mr. Mobley candidly admits effective his consumer “I don't have a speedometer up my ass.”   The bar finds this say also admission shocking.   The bar finds that attorneys have a responsibility to behave towards their clients accompanied by respect.   This say does not evidence respect appropriate to the client, also was not received well via his client.   This shortage of respect substantially undermined the confidence of the consumer in the attorney's services, also was lately origin appropriate to termination of the relationship.

Though the trial bar specifically cited this say in support of its finding that Mr. Mobley was fired appropriate to lately cause, the trial bar heard much other testimony that indicated that Mr. Barnett had origin appropriate to firing Mr. Mobley.   As stated above, we review this case de novo.  Williams, supra.   Furthermore, we may go to the record to affirm.  Hosey v. Burgess, 319 Ark. 183, 890 S.W.2d 262 (1995).   In reviewing the other evidence presented at trial, we agree accompanied by the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Mobley was fired appropriate to cause.   Mr. Barnett testified at trial that Mr. Mobley refused to return phone calls.   Mr. Mobley responded that Mr. Barnett had not specifically asked him to return his calls, so he did not.   Mr. Barnett too testified that Mr. Mobley offered to supply a phony photo of a wrecked car, not the one in which Mr. Barnett was a passenger, as Mr. Barnett had not pleased photos of the car.   Mr. Barnett testified that although he had expressed his desire appropriate to Mr. Mobley to inform his creditors regarding the unsettled litigation, Mr. Mobley never contacted them to explain Mr. Barnett's situation.   There was too testimony at trial that Mr. Mobley did not recognize Mr. Barnett or remember the facts of his case when Mr. Barnett finally did grow to meet accompanied by Mr. Mobley.

Mr. Mobley's failure to communicate accompanied by his client, the disputed present with to supply a phony photo of the car, also Mr. Mobley's failure to write education to creditors while his consumer requested exacerbated the disrespectful nature of his “speedometer” say amounts to origin appropriate to firing Mr. Mobley.   We hold that the trial bar did not commit reversible error in finding that he was fired appropriate to cause.   Accordingly, we declare on this point.

Mr. Mobley asserts appropriate to his second point on plead that the trial bar should have applied the attorney's lien statute as he was not fired appropriate to origin or, in the alternative, that the trial court's quantum meruit fee give was shorter than he had earned.   Because we have firm that Mr. Mobley was fired appropriate to cause, we need not reach the issue of whether the attorney's lien statute should apply.²

Mr. Mobley's substitute argument that he was not allotted an appropriate portion of the settlement fails.   On this point, we declare the trial court.

 In Crockett & Brown, P.A., supra, we held that regular if an solicitor is fired appropriate to cause, he is entitled to the sensible value of his services to the day of discharge.   The sensible value of an attorney's services is steady via an attorney's ability also experience, bond between the parties, the problem of the services, the extent of the litigation, also the while also labor devoted to the origin also the results obtained.  Robinson v. Champion, 251 Ark. 817, 475 S.W.2d 677 (1972).

Here, the trial bar made its determination of the fees to be present awarded to Mr. Mobley based on the while he used up on the case, the labor involved, his ability also ability, also the nature also extent of the litigation.   The trial bar establish that one-fourth of the quantity of the settlement was due to Mr. Mobley, in part, as the case took sixteen months to be present resolved, also Mr. Mobley worked on the case appropriate to four months, or one-fourth the quantity of time.   The trial bar too establish that Mr. Mobley was an experienced solicitor who had handled personal injury cases since 1958.   The trial bar firm that Mr. Mobley had performed services appropriate to four months until he was terminated also that Mr. Yoakley had too performed adequately while Mr. Barnett's solicitor appropriate to twelve months, also that each should be present compensated accordingly.   From the bench, the trial bar stated:  “The only fair way I can see to come up accompanied by a sensible fee is to separate the while that Mr. Mobley used up on the case.   He used up one-fourth of the while also Mr. Yoakley had it three-fourths of the while that it took to conclude.”   Because the trial bar considered Mr. Mobley's effort, experience, ability also while spent, he sufficiently considered the factors in Crockett & Brown, P.A., supra, that led to a sensible distribution of fees to Mr. Mobley also Mr. Yoakley.

Accordingly, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The attorney's fees were one-third of $50,000.00, or $16,667.00, also tendered to the court.

2.   Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-301(1987) states in the annotations:  “The attorney's lien statutes, this section by way of § 16-22-303, do not apply to cases in which an solicitor is terminated appropriate to cause.”

RAY THORNTON, Justice.

CORBIN, J., not participating.

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